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В статье обсуждаются рукописи Людвига Витгенштейна, в  которых он ставил проблему не-
возможности «феноменологического языка», который он определяет как «описание непосред-
ственного чувственного восприятия, без добавок гипотетического». В этой фазе его философии 
(1929–1933) есть некоторая парадоксальность, так как она с самого начала описывается самими 
философом как уже преодоленная; мы имеем дело с философской самокритикой. В качестве 
аналогии по отношению к критикуемому проекту «феноменологического языка» приводится 
парадокс Льюиса Кэрролла: парадокс до нелепого подробной карты, совпадающей с картогра-
фируемой областью. Проводится сопоставление витгенштейновского проекта «первичного 
языка» и языка феноменологической философии XX века.
Ключевые слова: Людвиг Витгенштейн, феноменологический язык, первичный язык, Льюис 
Кэрролл.
Here the temptation to believe in a phenomenology, 
something midway between science and logic, is very 
great. […] There is indeed no such thing as phenome-
nology, but there are phenomenological problems.
(Wittgenstein, 1978, 9, 15, 49)
The so-called “phenomenological phase”1 (Kuusela, Ometita & Uçan, 2018, i; 
Hacker, 2019, 286) in Wittgenstein’s philosophy was not a long one: it was the period 
from 1929 to 1933. But it didn’t really last for four years; it rather was “have-been-
passed” all those four years. Wittgenstein’s phase of search of the “phenomenological 
language” is a kind of paradox: each time it is already an overcome phase—he nearly 
always writes about it in the past tense. In this article I will discuss this project (rather 
* Статья является результатом исследовательского проекта №18-011-00582 при финансовой 
поддержке РФФИ «Метод позднего Витгенштейна: сведение (девальвация) традиционных 
проблем метафизики к философской головоломке».
1 In Wittgenstein’s case the “phenomenological phase” is equivalent to the period of search of the 
“phenomenological language.” It was not the case for philosophers who considered themselves to 
be “phenomenologists”: for them it was one of the elements of phenomenological investigation, but 
not the central one.
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untypical for the corpus of his work as a whole) in the context of the philosopher’s 
working manuscripts.
Using the modality of something “always already discarded,” Wittgenstein de-
scribes the project as follows: “[The] phenomenological language: description of im-
mediate sense perception without any hypothetical addition” (Wittgenstein, 2005, 
349). Here it is possible to agree with Peter Hacker that it would be more appropriate 
to call this phase as the project of “phenomenalist language” (Hacker, 2019, 286), and 
not of a “phenomenological one,” although Wittgenstein persistently uses specifically 
this expression. I have already quoted, as the epigraph, the Wittgensteinian aphorism 
“There is indeed no such thing as phenomenology, but there are phenomenological 
problems” (Wittgenstein, 1978, 49)—from the very beginning of the described phase 
of 1929–1933, he proceeds from the impossibility to build a complete phenomeno-
logical philosophy, even if he does not deny the impulses (“phenomenological prob-
lems”) urging him towards it.
* * *
After the first very enthusiastic attempt to bring together the “phenomenolog-
ical phase” of Wittgenstein’s thought and the phenomenological philosophy of the 
XX-th century (Spiegelberg, 1968), the researches and commentators, in fact with no 
dissent, split these traditions apart, insisting that Wittgenstein was talking about “phe-
nomenology” in his own special sense (Inde, 1975; Gier, 1981; Hintikka, 1998; Park, 
1998; Engelmann, 2013; Piekarski, 2017). This expression “in his own special sense” 
can sound a bit ironical because exactly at that period Wittgenstein moved from the 
criticism of the phenomenological language to the criticism of the private language 
which includes the usage of common expressions “in someone’s own special sense.”
It is quite illustrative that from the very beginning, namely from 1929, the con-
cept of “phenomenological language” appeared in Wittgenstein’s manuscripts as a 
misconception already discarded. In a way this is each time an “already discarded” 
misconception which he never supported:
The assumption that a phenomenological language is possible, and that only it would 
express what we in philosophy must/want to say, is—I think—absurd. We must learn to 
live with our everyday language and only understand it correctly. […] I do not now have 
phenomenological language, or ‘primary language’ as I used to call it, in mind as my goal. 
I no longer hold it to be necessary. All that is possible and necessary is to separate what 
is essential from what is inessential in our language. That is, if we so to speak describe 
the class of languages which serve their purpose, then in so doing we have shown what is 
essential to them and given an immediate representation of immediate experience. Each 
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time I say that, instead of such and such a representation, you could also use this other 
one, we take a further step towards the goal of grasping the essence of what is represent-
ed. (Wittgenstein, 1994, 102, 118; eng. tr. Wittgenstein, 1975, 51)
For us, Wittgenstein’s readers, the idea of the “phenomenological language” is 
introduced as a retroactively discarded conception, an object of self-criticism. “I do 
not now have phenomenological language, or ‘primary language’ as I used to call it, 
in mind as my goal” (Wittgenstein, 1994, 118)—writes the Austrian philosopher. This 
expression “is no longer [considered] to be my goal” puts the reader into an untena-
ble position: even if we work with manuscripts and typescripts we do not have access 
to the hypothetical phase during which the “phenomenological language” was still 
Wittgenstein’s target. Strangely as it is, “[the] description of immediate sense percep-
tion without any hypothetical addition” (Wittgenstein, 2005, 349) seems itself to be 
a “hypothetical addition” to the corpus of the philosopher’s works that has reached 
us. We are facing a strange temporal structure: the philosopher “in the past deemed” 
something to be a “phenomenological language,” however, “now he understands” that 
it was superfluous and even absurd. Wittgenstein writes in Remarks on Colors: “Here 
the temptation to believe in a phenomenology, something midway between science 
and logic, is very great” (Wittgenstein, 1978, 15). The philosopher who considered 
the unsolved philosophical problems to be his own sins has a due understanding now 
how one should treat this temptation—one should fight it. But we, the readers, com-
prehend only this mise-en-scene—“before I believed…,” but “I don’t adhere to this 
view any longer”:
Ich habe früher geglaubt, daß es die Umgangssprache gibt, in der wir alle für gewöh-
nlich sprechen und eine primäre Sprache, die das ausdrückt, was wir wirklich wissen, 
also die Phänomene. Ich habe auch von einem ersten System und einem zweiten Sys-
tem gesprochen. […] Ich möchte jetzt ausführen, warum ich an dieser Auffassung nicht 
mehr festhalte. Ich glaube, daß wir im Wesen nur eine Sprache haben und das ist die 
gewöhnliche Sprache. Wir brauchen nicht erst eine neue Sprache zu erfinden oder eine 
Symbolik zu konstruieren, sondern die Umgangssprache ist bereits die Sprache, voraus-
gesetzt, daß wir sie von Unklarheiten, die in ihr stecken, befreien. (Wittgenstein as cited 
in Waismann, 1967, 45)
Wittgenstein implies that we have only one language, and this is a common lan-
guage. Here he abandons his programme of inventing artificial, ideal languages (the 
hypothetical phenomenological language would be one of them). He clearly treats 
the “phenomenological” aspect of the language as an invention, but not as a natural 
feature of the everyday language, one of its modalities. Does it mean that the everyday 
language which he finally infers is necessarily not a phenomenological language, or, 
262 GEORGY CHERNAVIN
rather, this is a language which does have a phe-
nomenological dimension but is more capacious 
in a natural way than the phenomenological lan-
guage? This fragment seems to highlight that 
Wittgenstein broadened his concept of everyday 
language, including the aspects that he previous-
ly considered to belong to the primal language 
expressing phenomena.
There is something strange in this new 
strategy (which appears to oppose the “ever-
more” discarded strategy of search of the “phe-
nomenological language”). Namely: the everyday 
language should help itself; it contains an illness 
and the cure, a dead-end and the way out. In 
this context, the philosophers polemically men-
tioned by Wittgenstein adhered to quite different 
views—in particular, a vitalist Hans Driesch and 
an empiriocriticist Ernst Mach:
Phenomenological language: the description of immediate sense perception without any 
hypothetical addition. If anything, then surely a portrayal in a painted picture or the like 
must be such a description of immediate experience. Such as when we look through a 
telescope, for instance, and draw or paint the constellation we see. Let’s even imagine 
that our sense perception is reproduced by creating a model for describing it, a model 
that, seen from a certain point, produces these perceptions; this machine could be set 
into proper motion with a crank drive, and by turning the crank, we could read off the 
description. (An approximation to this would be a representation in film.) If that isn’t 
a representation of the immediate—then what can be?—Anything that claimed to be 
even more immediate would have to forego being a description. Instead of a description, 
what results in that case is that inarticulate sound with which some authors would like 
to begin philosophy. (“Knowing of my knowing, I consciously possess something.”—
Driesch.) […] One of the clearest examples of the confusion between physical and phe-
nomenological language is the picture Mach sketched of his field of vision, in which the 
so-called blurredness of the shapes toward the edge of his visual field was reproduced 
by a blurredness (in a quite different sense) in the drawing. No, you can’t make a visible 
picture of your visual image. (Wittgenstein, 2005, 349, 337)
Here Wittgenstein clearly enters into polemics with the very concept of the phil-
osophically exact self-portrait, similar to the one proposed by Ernst Mach, which in-
cludes not only the pattern of the perceived, but also the representation of perception 
as such. The idea of “phenomenological language” is coupled with the depiction of the 
Ernst Mach, Self-portrait, 1886  
(Krois, J. M., Rosengren, M., Steidele, A., & 
Westerkamp, D. (Еds.) (2007).  
Embodiment in Cognition and 
Culture. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: 
John Benjamins Publishing. Р. 91)
HORIZON 10 (1) 2021 263
actual reality, for all the contradictory nature of this objective: “Anything that claimed 
to be even more immediate would have to forego being a description” (Wittgenstein, 
2005, 349e) This paradox resembles the paradox of an absurdly exact map formulated 
by Lewis Carroll:
“We actually made a map of the country, on the scale of a mile to the mile!”
“Have you used it much?” I enquired.
“It has never been spread out, yet,” said Mein Herr: “the farmers objected: they said it 
would cover the whole country, and shut out the sunlight! So we now use the country 
itself, as its own map, and I assure you it does nearly as well”.
(Carroll, 1893, 169)
The “phenomenological language,” as presented by Wittgenstein, functions as 
a similar map, absurdly detailed. He discusses the “phenomenological language” in 
categories of belief, namely the belief he lost himself. As if the “phenomenological 
language” would only be a matter of belief, while discussing this belief is possible only 
when it is lost. But why actually should this project be a subject of belief? Wittgenstein 
does not give any answer to this question; instead he proposes to withdraw from be-
lieving in the actual possibility (and even more in the need) of the phenomenological 
language the same way as we stop believing in the existence of philosophical prob-
lems, considering them to be the results of misconception. Questions of philosophical 
nature should disperse in the way the spell induced by a witch clears off, together with 
the witch, when we realize that witches do not exist. Helpless roaming in a philosoph-
ical labyrinth—this is the image of philosophy Wittgenstein wants to draw us away 
from. However, he himself draws this image of philosophy, falling within the Carroll’s 
paradox of the “absurdly exact map”. The “phenomenological language” is tentative-
ly structured as a dead-end from the onset and this way is created (!). Wittgenstein 
wants to disperse the spell, but instead he retroactively creates it. The philosopher 
continues to develop this imagery and views (comparable of the renowned The Big 
Typescript) in a fragment dating to 1936:
Warum verzichten wir plötzlich darauf, das Wesen der Sprache, & das Wesen der Welt, 
auszudrücken? „Phänomenologische Sprache“. Glaube an ihre Notwendigkeit. Es schien 
als sei unsere Sprache, irgendwie, roh, eine unvollkommene Darstellung der Sachverhal-
te & nur als rohes, unvollkommenes Abbild zu verstehen. Als müßte die Philosophie sie 
verbessern, verfeinern, um so den Bau der Welt verstehen zu können. Dann wurde es 
offenbar daß sie die […] Sprache wie sie ist verstehen, d.h. erkennen müsse, weil nicht 
eine neue Klarheit, die die alte Sprache nicht gebe, das Ziel sei, sondern die Beseitigung 
der philosophischen {Irrgärten, bewilderment. Perplexities, Herumirren, Ratlosigkeit, 
Sich-nicht-auskennen, Perplex-sein, Rätsel, Irrfragen, ich meine eine Frage die dazu 
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gestellt ist in einen Irrgarten zu führen, wie sie etwa eine Hexe stellen könnte.} „Und 
Deine Schwierigkeiten sind Mißverständnisse“. — Wenn sie nicht Mißverständnisse wä-
ren, wenn wir wirklich weiter analysieren müßten um auf sichern Grund & Boden zu 
kommen, dann müßten wir uns fragen: durch welchen feineren Begriff haben wir den 
landläufigen Begriff „Wort“ (z.B.) zu ersetzen. Wir müßten dann die üblichen Wörter 
mit ihrem Gebrauch zur Seite räumen um in der Tiefe nach den eigentlichen Begriffen 
zu forschen nach denen wir die Sprache anpassen müssen. (Wittgenstein, 1936, Ms. 152, 
91–92)
It is somewhat strange that Wittgenstein in this manuscript treats the expres-
sion of the substance of the language and that of the world as the most complete 
representation of state of affairs through the language. The language and the world 
for him remain something like two orders that should match correctly, although the 
very idea of the “phenomenological language” is not much likely to imply such an 
apposition. Complete versus incomplete depiction of state of affairs—what is funda-
mentally the difference? The completeness of depiction does not bring us closer to the 
“phenomenological language.” The “phenomenological language” is an expression, 
but not a depiction, where the language and the world get overlapped within this 
expression. The “phenomenological language” is the language which is created here 
and now, captured just at the moment of its origination, at the moment of occurrence 
of the verbal intention. Wittgenstein often operates with corporified objects here: the 
language, the world, which seem to exist already. In this case, he expresses, rather, 
an engineering-specific view of these concepts instead of the phenomenological one, 
even where he seems to be approaching the phenomenological (in the sense of the Eu-
ropean philosophy of the XX century) scope of issues. “To improve the language,” “to 
comprehend the structure of the world”—he operates here rather with set construc-
tions. One can get an impression from this manuscript that Wittgenstein—when he 
raises the issue of the “phenomenological language”—in one respect, keeps to the en-
gineering and technical attitude towards the language, and, in the other respect, im-
plicitly alludes that the phenomenological nature of the language implies some kind 
of idealism aimed to „Sprache wie sie ist [zu] verstehen, d.h. [zu] erkennen“, „in der 
Tiefe nach den eigentlichen Begriffen zu suchen nach denen wir die Sprache anpassen 
müssen“ (Wittgenstein, 1936, Ms. 152, 92). The profundity, genuineness, perception 
of the language as it is—it means that Wittgenstein once again cogitates on some ide-
al language and supposes the “phenomenological language” to be an ideal language. 
Essentially, he effects ideation through ready constructs, now simply projecting them 
towards the ideal depth. However, this is rather a step in the direction of metaphysics 
(which is more understandable from such a view point), but not phenomenology. The 
ideal language of the Tractatus logico-philosophicus echoes closely the ideal metaphys-
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ical language with “authentic” concepts deep within, that can be “perceived as is” to 
a significantly greater extent than in the case of the “phenomenological language.” 
Paradoxically, Wittgenstein most closely approaches the comprehension of the “phe-
nomenological language” when he discusses our everyday language and denotes it as 
“raw.” The raw language is far more phenomenological than the ideal, improved one. 
But the “phenomenological language” for Wittgenstein in this textual fragment is not 
the common everyday language, but rather something to believe or disbelieve (like 
one can believe or not believe in the existence of unicorns) and which, once gained, 
must somehow transform the common language. It means that this concept is still a 
construct, an invention for him. Wittgenstein writes about the language that should 
keep us away from philosophical labyrinths, dead-ends, bewilderment, perplexities, 
puzzles, deceptive questions. It means the ideal language should help us to avoid con-
fusion. Is it possible to improve the language through invention, so that it would not 
confuse us? First, we need to identify the “right way” that would help us not to be led 
astray. What is the status of this right way? Does the adequacy of the language lie in 
its congruence with the reality, the capacity to mirror the reality as it is, while not 
without adding anything to it on our part? And where does this right way of follow-
ing the reality bring us? It seems, we should think in the below manner: the state of 
affairs is as we know it, and we talk about it not to get confused. Therefore we face 
two isomorphic orders: the world and the language. The world, for the “phenomeno-
logical language” (in terms of the phenomenological philosophy of the XX century) 
which is always a bit “raw,” is also “raw.” It cannot be described by a set of rightful 
propositions since it is always elusive, incomplete, being not at all a totality of de-facto 
circumstances, but something that needs to be treated separately as a fundamental 
philosophical topic.
* * *
The issue of (im)possibility of the “phenomenological language” was crucial at 
least for Husserlian, Finkian and Heideggerian phenomenologies. Husserl considered 
the strategy of building a highly technical phenomenological “newspeak”—the termi-
nology comprising complex neologisms, eclectically based on Greek and Latin roots, 
a “transcendental language” (Husserl as cited in Fink, 1988, 104, 107). Heidegger, up 
to the end of the phenomenological phase of his philosophy, tended to the “trans-
formation of language”, to the metamorphose (Verwandlung) already undergone by 
the existing language in the philosophical context, when the pre-existing meanings 
slightly shift to a direction not yet known (Heidegger, 1989, 78). Fink doubts the pos-
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sibility of “transcendental language,” but still considers that one should implement the 
phenomenological “reduction of the language”; doing so, one should show, through 
the medium of the natural language, the content which is foreign to it, being always 
aware of irremovable divergence between the phenomenological sense and the natu-
ral word-meanings (Fink, 1988, 93, 104, 107). These are only few examples of a rich 
tradition of reflection on (im)possibility of the phenomenological language within the 
phenomenological philosophy of the XX-th century.
Wittgenstein is not involved in these debates, but we tried to make it visible how 
he approaches the similar problematics (in a way comparable with a natural language 
that shows the transcendental-phenomenological content which is foreign to it), being 
always aware of the irremovable divergence between the Wittgensteinian “phenome-
nological language” and the “phenomenological language” of the phenomenological 
philosophy (Husserl’s, Fink’s or Heidegger’s for example). To summarize: the “phe-
nomenological language” for phenomenologists is a “bracketed language” (Husserl (as 
cited in Fink, 1988, 104)) or a “language in quotation marks”; Wittgenstein warns us 
against this strategy claiming that, when building terminology on indirect meanings, 
on words in quotation marks, “you’re using language in a queer way, because you’re 
almost deliberately preparing misunderstandings” (Wittgenstein, 1967, 65).
Wittgenstein is clearly and deliberately far from Husserlian and Heideggerian 
strategies (from technical neologisms and transformation of meanings in a direction 
not yet known); he is much closer to Fink who considered the “transcendental lan-
guage” to be impossible. The main difference between their strategies consists in the 
fact that Fink (despite the irremovable divergence between the phenomenological 
sense and the natural word-meanings) considered the phenomenological language to 
be a (paradoxical, problematic, but still) desideratum, and Wittgenstein puts a ban on 
it, claiming it to be a hopeless direction. 
One may still have an impression that, talking of the (im)possibility of the “phe-
nomenological language,” Wittgenstein is rather substituting it by a certain metaphys-
ical projection which partly inherits the attitude of his logical-positivist period. In 
search for the “phenomenological language,” he considers at this stage that one should 
withdraw from common expressions and their usage, from the “raw” everyday lan-
guage—however, the “phenomenological language” treated in this manner proves to 
be another invention inspired by the same scientific/technical pathos aimed to im-
prove the language, make it more correct, etc. It happens to be Wittgenstein’s inven-
tion, while the latter himself cautions against its usage.
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